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Abstract
Payments systems are typically characterized by some degree of tiering, with upstream ﬁrms
(clearing agents) providing settlement accounts to downstream institutions that wish to clear and
settle payments indirectly in these systems (indirect clearers). Clearing agents provide their
indirect clearers with an essential input (clearing and settlement services), while also competing
directly with them in the retail market for payment services. The authors construct a model of a
clearing agent with an indirect clearer to examine the clearing agent’s incentives to lever off its
upstream position to gain a competitive advantage in the retail payment services market. The
model demonstrates that a clearing agent can attain this competitive advantage by raising the
indirect clearer’s costs, but that the incentive to raise these costs is mitigated by credit risk to the
clearing agent from the provision of uncollateralized overdrafts to its indirect clearer. The results
suggest that tiered payments systems, which require clearing agents to provide overdraft facilities
to their indirect clearers, may result in a more competitive retail payment services market.
JEL classiﬁcation: G21, L12, L13, L22
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial institutions; Financial services; Market structure and pricing;
Payment, clearing, and settlement systems
Résumé
Les systèmes de paiement sont généralement caractérisés à des degrés divers par le principe de la
participation à plusieurs niveaux, où des ﬁrmes en amont (les agents de compensation) fournissent
des comptes de règlement à des institutions en aval (les sous-adhérents) qui désirent faire
compenser et régler indirectement des paiements par l’intermédiaire de ces systèmes. Les agents
de compensation apportent une contribution essentielle aux sous-adhérents (des services de
compensation et de règlement), tout en se trouvant en concurrence directe avec ces derniers sur le
marché des services de paiement au détail. Les auteurs élaborent un modèle faisant intervenir un
agent de compensation et un sous-adhérent, aﬁn d’examiner la motivation du premier à mettre à
proﬁt sa position d’institution en amont pour se donner un avantage concurrentiel sur le marché
des services de paiement au détail. Le modèle démontre qu’un agent de compensation peut
acquérir cet avantage en augmentant les coûts imposés au sous-adhérent, mais que sa motivation à
hausser ces coûts est restreinte par le risque de crédit auquel il s’expose du fait qu’il consent des
découverts non garantis aux sous-adhérents. Les résultats de l’étude portent à croire que les
systèmes de paiement à participation par paliers, qui obligent les agents de règlement à accordervi
des découverts aux sous-adhérents avec lesquels ils traitent, sont susceptibles d’accroître la
compétitivité du marché des services de paiement au détail.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G21, L12, L13, L22
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Institutions ﬁnancières; Services ﬁnanciers; Structure de marché et
ﬁxation des prix; Système de paiement, de compensation et de règlement1. Introduction
Participants in most payments systems around the world must choose between clearing and
settling their payments directly in these systems, or clearing and settling their payments
indirectly through institutions that act as clearing agents. In other words, payment ar-
rangements typically involve various tiers of intermediation. At the top of the hierarchy are
settlement institutions, generally central banks, which provide settlement accounts to partic-
ipating banking institutions connecting directly to, and clearing directly in, this “ﬁrst-tier”
network. Of these direct clearers (DCs), some act as clearing agents (CAs) that operate a
“second-tier” network, providing settlement accounts to downstream institutions that wish
to clear and settle payments indirectly in the payments system (indirect clearers or ICs).
This study focuses on the suitability of the basic contractual terms between CAs and their
ICs. In most payments systems, little is known about these contractual arrangements, ex-
cept that the terms will likely be quite system-speciﬁc and non-standardized. For example,
in the Canadian Payments Association’s Automated Clearing Settlement System (ACSS),
the contracts between a CA and its ICs are bilaterally negotiated and can vary across ICs,
since the clearing and settlement services are bundled with other IC-speciﬁc services (Tri-
partite Study Group 2006). Despite the lack of standardization, these contracts all feature
a requirement that CAs provide settlement credit lines to their ICs. Some CAs in the ACSS
indicate that, because of processing and information lags in payment accounting and mon-
itoring technologies, the settlement credits extended by the CA to the borrowing IC are
eﬀectively uncollateralized overdrafts. For this study, the basic features of interest in the
contract between a CA and its IC for wholesale payment services are the fee for clearing and
settlement services and the overdraft facility provided to the IC.
In addition to providing wholesale payment services through second-tier networks, CAs
compete directly with their ICs in the retail market for payment services. Consequently, a
CA may face incentives to lever oﬀ its upstream position, using its wholesale payment fee
charged to ICs or access to overdrafts, to gain a competitive advantage in the downstream
market. The speciﬁc research question in this paper is whether the uncollateralized overdrafts
extended by a CA to an IC mitigate the incentive for the CA to strategically price its clearing
and settlement services to gain an advantage in the retail payment services market. Under
the conditions speciﬁed in the following model, our analysis suggests that a CA can attain
such a competitive advantage by raising the IC’s costs—its rival in the retail payment services
market—but that the potential for credit loss from the provision of uncollateralized overdrafts
may limit the incentive to do so.
11.1 Importance of tiered payments systems
A recent study by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS 2003) on the
role of central bank money measures the degree of tiering in selected payments systems, in
a sample of developed countries. The study uses two measures for the degree of tiering: the
proportion of ﬁnancial institutions in the country that participate as DCs in the system; and
the value of payments in the system accounted for by these DCs. In tiered systems, the large
banking institutions are typically the major CAs in the system, while the smaller institutions
participate as ICs. Mid-size banks may participate directly in the ﬁrst-tier network, but not
usually as CAs.
Table 1 describes the study’s assessment of the degree of tiering in the selected payment,
clearing, and settlement systems of the countries surveyed.
2Table 1: Degree of tiering in various countries’ payments systems
Degree of tiering By number of institutions By value of payments
None                               all, or virtually all, are DCs all, or virtually all, value
Low                                 at least 75% are DCs at least 90% of value
Mixed                              25-75% are DCs 25%-90% of value
High                                 5-25% are DCs 10-25% of value
Strong                              less than 5% are DCs less than 10% of value
Source: CPSS (2003). Situation at end of 2002, except where otherwise noted.
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3The results indicate that most payment, clearing, and settlement systems in these coun-
tries are tiered systems, although the degree of tiering varies signiﬁcantly across systems.
Tiered clearing and settlement networks are, therefore, the norm rather than the exception
in payments systems.
1.2 The modelling approach for the tiered system
To answer our basic research question, we construct a model of a vertically integrated mo-
nopolist competing against a downstream rival in the end-user market for payment services.
To this standard industrial organization (IO) model, an element of the interbank relationship
is introduced, arising from the provision of clearing and settlement services by the CA to
its IC. The CA is obliged to provide daylight overdraft facilities to the IC by settling the
IC’s net payment ﬂow before receiving those funds at the end of the day. Thus, the CA
incurs credit risk, because the IC may default on its end-of-day payment obligations. This
transforms a standard IO model, with a vertical structure and horizontal competition, into
a model of banks in a tiered arrangement within a payments system
1.3 Review of the academic literature
Two major strands of the literature are relevant to this paper: the IO literature on vertically
integrated ﬁrms and the settlement literature on credit and tiering.
1.3.1 IO literature on vertically integrated ﬁrms
It is well established that where there is imperfect competition and independent pricing
in both the upstream (wholesale) and downstream (retail) markets, the retail price will
encompass two stacked markups (called double marginalization) over combined production
and delivery costs (Spengler 1950). Joint wholesale and retail proﬁts are lower than they
would be if wholesale and retail services were produced and priced by a single, vertically
integrated ﬁrm, thus creating an incentive for vertical integration.
Even if the retail market were perfectly competitive and the retail price contained only
the wholesale proﬁt markup, an incentive for a ﬁrm to integrate vertically can still exist. As
Salop (1998) explains, by raising downstream rivals’ costs, a vertically integrated ﬁrm may be
able to gain suﬃcient market power to price above the competitive level in the downstream
market. These higher downstream prices harm consumers, and the decrease in purchases
associated with the higher prices causes a deadweight loss. Salop states further that there
4may be a reduction in economic eﬃciency if the increased input cost to downstream rivals
causes them to use a less-eﬃcient input mix.
When the input price is regulated, a vertically integrated ﬁrm can still raise its down-
stream rivals’ costs by imposing some non-price discrimination, such as delaying the delivery
or degrading the quality of the input. The imposition of non-price costs on downstream rivals
is termed “sabotage” in the literature. Economides (1998), and others, demonstrates that,
as long as the costs of sabotage and the upstream proﬁt margin are suﬃciently small, an
incentive for cost-increasing sabotage exists.
Bustos and Galetovic (2003) show that, in the absence of wholesale price regulation,
a vertically integrated ﬁrm with monopoly power in the wholesale market would prefer to
increase the input price charged to downstream rivals instead of raising rivals’ costs through
non-price discrimination. Hence, non-price discrimination arises only where the input price
is regulated. Thus, a vertically integrated monopolist will generally have an incentive to raise
its rivals’ costs, and furthermore it prefers to do so by increasing the input price it charges.
1.3.2 Settlement literature on credit and tiering
Kahn and Roberds (1998) examine the incentives for default by participants in a deferred
net settlement system, where a participating bank’s payment inﬂows and outﬂows are accu-
mulated through the period and ﬁnal settlement at the end of the period is on a net payable
basis. In eﬀect, the banks in a deferred net settlement system extend intraday credit and
acquire intraday loans through the day. Although Kahn and Roberds analyze single-tiered
networks, the credit relationship they articulate is relevant for tiered network structures,
since second-tier networks are essentially deferred net settlement systems for intranetwork
payments. From their paper, we take our model of a bank facing uncertain payment ﬂows.
However, unlike Kahn and Roberds, default in our model does not arise strategically, but
rather from constraints on liquidity.
Recently, a number of studies have been performed relating to the integration of secu-
rities infrastructure networks operated by central securities depositories (CSDs). There are
interesting similarities between tiered structures for securities systems and those of payments
systems.
Tapking and Yang (2004) examine horizontal and vertical consolidation in a two-country
model with a CSD and single trading system in each country. All securities traded in a given
5country are settled in that country’s CSD, but a cross-border trade requires the transfer of
securities between CSDs through a horizontal service link. They ﬁnd that either horizontal or
vertical integration of CSDs leads to higher social welfare than a decentralized system. They
also ﬁnd that, under some conditions, vertical integration between a CSD and the trading
system in a country is relatively more cost-eﬃcient than horizontal integration between CSDs.
The social welfare gains from vertical and horizontal integration arise from externalities in
demand for complementary goods or services. Economides and Salop (1992) consider multiple
brands of compatible (complementary and substitute) products or services in network market
arrangements under Cournot competition. They ﬁnd that market prices are lower under
joint ownership (i.e., vertical or horizontal integration) when cross-service complementarity in
demand is suﬃciently high (vertical integration) and substitutability in demand is suﬃciently
low (horizontal integration).
In a model with a single CSD and two custodian banks, one of which is vertically inte-
grated with the CSD, Holthausen and Tapking (2004) demonstrate that, in equilibrium, the
CSD will raise the costs of the rival custodian bank. The CSD can, therefore, oﬀer a more
attractive pricing scheme to customers than can the rival custodian bank. Thus, the rival
custodian bank retains only those customers who have a strong preference for its services.
However, the CSD’s market share is not necessarily larger than the socially optimal one,
since there is a greater potential for netting across the CSD’s increased customer base.
Rochet (2005) examines the incentives for a CSD to vertically integrate with one of
two custodian banks, each of which charges a ﬁxed access fee and per-transaction fee in the
downstream market. Through vertical integration, the CSD can increase its proﬁt by refusing
to provide the rival custodian bank with settlement services. If regulation prevents exclusion
of the rival custodian bank, the vertically integrated CSD raises its rival’s costs, and the result
is a lower per-transaction fee but higher ﬁxed access fee charged by the vertically integrated
CSD than by its rival. The market share of the vertically integrated CSD increases, and that
of the rival bank decreases, relative to the case without vertical integration. Moreover, social
welfare increases, not taking into account the direct and indirect costs of regulation.
2. The Model
The basic theoretical model developed for this analysis builds on the work described above.
There are two principal diﬀerences in the model structure in this paper from the models of
6vertically structured securities systems: (i) only a single per-unit price scheme is considered
for wholesale payment services (any ﬁxed access fee to the clearing and settlement networks
is exogenous and embedded in the ﬁxed costs of the CA and IC), and (ii) the wholesale
services provided by the CA to the IC include both clearing and settlement services and
overdraft credit services. This is a crucial diﬀerence, since aggressive exploitation of even
its limited market power in the wholesale settlement services market might, under some cir-
cumstances, reduce its proﬁtability in providing overdraft loan services. The model speciﬁed
below is designed to determine the circumstances under which this would be the case and its
implications for retail market competitiveness.
2.1 The set-up
We model a representative tiered arrangement, in which there is a DC providing clearing and
settlement services to an IC. In other words, the DC is acting as a CA for the IC. The CA
provides payment services to end users at the price pCA, and provides clearing and settlement
services to an IC at the price w. The IC also provides payment services to end users, but
at a diﬀerent price, pIC, and hence competes downstream with the CA in a Cournot game.
Note that we abstract from competition between CAs for ICs.
For each bank, a proportion β ∈ (0,1] of payments have to be cleared and settled ex-
ternally. In other words, a proportion 1 − β of payments are cleared and settled internally
on the books of each institution (these are also referred to as “on-us payments”). Payments
that are cleared and settled externally for the IC incur the clearing and settlement charge,
w, chosen by the CA, and payments that are cleared and settled externally for the CA in-
cur a clearing and settlement fee, s, imposed by the central bank. These externally cleared
and settled payments are also referred to as “on-them payments.” Finally, let qCA and qIC
denote the volume of payment instructions demanded by end users from the CA and IC,
respectively, given their respective retail payment services fees. The model will, however, be
solved in quantities with an inverse demand rather than prices with a demand function. By
construction, the equilibrium prices and quantities are identical.
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the representative tiered payments system that will
be modelled.
Retail Demand for Payment Services The inverse demand functions facing the IC and
the CA are P(q,q0) = 1 − q − γq0, where 0 < γ ≤ 1 is a parameter for the substitutability
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between the CA’s and the IC’s payment services (less than one denotes imperfect substi-
tutability), q denotes own quantities, and q0 denotes the rival’s quantities. There is some
evidence of less-than-perfect market segmentation in the customer bases for CAs and ICs.
Typically, this is reﬂected in diﬀerences in the range and type of banking service packages,
which include payment services, oﬀered to business and personal customers. This allows for
imperfect substitutability in payment services demand.
Technology The processing cost of payments is C(q), where C0 > 0 and C00 ≤ 0, implying
increasing returns to scale in technology. Total payment processing costs consist of a ﬁxed
cost and a constant marginal cost, c.
Proﬁts from Retail Payment Services Banks’ proﬁts from payment services can be
written as follows.
πIC(qIC,qCA) = (1 − qIC − γqCA) qIC − (c + βw) qIC − FIC, (1)
πCA(qCA,qIC) = (1 − qCA − γqIC) qCA + wβqIC − (c + βs)(qCA + βqIC) − FCA, (2)
8where FIC is the ﬁxed cost of being an IC and FCA is the ﬁxed cost of being a CA. Generally, it
is assumed that FCA > FIC. CAs must set up internal processing and account management
systems to both participate in the ﬁrst-tier network and operate the second-tier network.
CAs must also integrate a sophisticated liquidity management function with their payment
services operations. ICs avoid many of these costs by outsourcing clearing and settlement to
a CA. Both CAs and ICs have more similar ﬁxed costs, however, for similar retail payment
services.
The proﬁt functions are concave with respect to their own outputs: ∂2πCA/∂q2
CA < 0,
∂2πIC/∂q2
IC < 0. Furthermore, ∂πCA/∂q2
IC = −γqIC + β(w − c − βs) can be positive or
negative, while ∂πIC/∂qCA < 0 and ∂2πCA/∂qCA∂qIC = ∂2πIC/∂qCA∂qIC < 0.
Credit Risk in the Provision of Daylight Overdrafts The demand and cost functions
for retail payments are deﬁned over transaction volumes. Since ﬁnancial risk will be intro-
duced, arising from the overdraft facilities that the CA is required to provide the IC, the
banks’ problems need to involve (stochastic) payment ﬂows. The net values of payment ﬂows
are denoted by a random variable, v, that is distributed according to a unimodal cdf, F(·),
with zero mean and bounded supports [−v,v]. The pdf of v is denoted by f(·).1 Since it
is not evident how (and whether) the distribution of net payment positions is related to the
volume of payments instructions submitted, we assume that this distribution is independent
of payment volume and is identical across the CA and the IC. That is,
vIC = vCA = v.
Letting the distributional supports diﬀer across the CA and the IC would not aﬀect the
results qualitatively. Furthermore, letting the supports be monotonic functions of q would
not change the results as long as the supports are such that probability densities at the lower
and upper bounds, f(v), are very small.
Let XIC be the IC’s realized net payment ﬂow. XIC > 0 denotes a net inﬂow (the IC
is a net receiver of funds), and XIC < 0 denotes a net outﬂow (the IC is a net sender of
funds and hence incurs daylight overdraft provided by the CA). An overdraft charge, rX
−
IC,
is incurred whenever XIC < 0, where X− = max{−X,0} and r is an exogenous interest rate
or predetermined overdraft fee. Hence, the net end-of-day payment obligation for an IC who
1Data on net debit positions of DCs in ACSS are suggestive of a bounded unimodal distribution centred
around zero.
9is a net sender is (1 + r)X
−
IC.
Let AIC be the IC’s end-of-day net asset position, before payment ﬂows are considered.
Recall that πIC is the IC’s proﬁt from payment services, net of processing and clearing costs
but gross of payment obligations to the CA. The IC’s cash ﬂow, before payment obligations
to the CA are considered, is then πIC + X
+
IC. Potential liquid assets are higher than cash
ﬂow because the IC can liquidate some of its net assets, AIC.
There are three possible scenarios when the IC realizes a net outﬂow, X
−
IC > 0:
(i) If πIC −(1+r)X
−
IC ≥ 0, then the IC can meet its payment obligations out of cash ﬂow
(proﬁts) and no assets need to be liquidated.
(ii) If πIC − (1 + r)X
−
IC < 0, then the IC has to liquidate some assets to meet its payment
obligations. The cost of liquidating an amount y of assets is δy, where δ ∈ (0,1).
Therefore, in order to meet a shortfall of −[πIC − (1 + r)X
−
IC] > 0, the IC is required







IC < 0, then the IC cannot meet its payment obligation even if
it liquidates all of its net assets. In this case, the IC defaults on its payment obligations
and the CA recovers only
AIC
1+δ + πIC(q).2
Timing Finally, the two institutions play a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the CA
chooses the clearing fee charged to the IC, w, and in the second stage the CA and the IC
simultaneously choose quantities, qCA and qIC, respectively, to maximize their expected net
worth subject to participation constraints, πi ≥ 0, i = {CA,IC}.
In a tiered system, the expected proﬁt from operating as a clearing agent should be higher
than it would be as a direct clearer only. Moreover, survey evidence (Tripartite Study Group
2006) indicates that, because of the cost conditions, the IC prefers to clear indirectly through
a CA than to become a DC itself, which is reﬂected in the model set-up. That is, expected
proﬁts from being an IC are higher than the expected proﬁts from a symmetric Cournot
game between two DCs. Thus, the IC engages in a symmetric Cournot competition with the
CA, in the retail services market.
2We allow only liquidity (or forced) defaults in this model. The model can be extended to study strategic
default, but since this is not the focus of the problem, this approach is not considered to reveal more about
the core behaviours.
10The model is solved for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) to the two-stage
game; that is, by backward induction, in which (i) the equilibrium Cournot quantities at the
retail level are derived, for a given clearing fee, w, and (ii) the CA’s equilibrium clearing fee
is derived, taking into account the Cournot quantities from the retail-level competition.
2.1.1 The indirect clearer’s problem
First, consider the IC’s problem. The IC’s net worth is as follows:
NWIC =

    
    
AIC + πIC + v if v ≥ 0
AIC + πIC + (1 + r)v if v < 0 ≤ πIC + (1 + r)v
AIC + (1 + δ)[πIC + (1 + r)v] if − AIC ≤ (1 + δ)[πIC + (1 + r)v] < 0
0 if (1 + δ)[πIC + (1 + r)v] < −AIC,
where πIC is given by equation (1).
When the net payment ﬂow to the IC is positive (v ≥ 0), the IC’s net worth increases
by the amount of the payment inﬂow. When the IC realizes a negative net payment ﬂow,
it takes a daylight overdraft from the DC and incurs an overdraft charge of −rv. Hence, its
payment obligation is −(1+r)v. If this amount is greater than its cash ﬂow from the proﬁts
earned by providing payment services, the IC is required to liquidate a portion of its net
assets at a cost δ to cover the shortfall between proﬁts and payment obligations. Finally, if
the realized net payment ﬂow is negative enough that the IC’s net assets cannot cover the
shortfall, the IC defaults and has zero net worth.
The IC’s problem, then, is one of choosing qIC to maximize expected net worth:
E(NW
IC) =AIC + πIC +
Z vIC
0















o[δπIC + (1 + δ)(1 + r)v] dF(v),
(3)
subject to πIC ≥ 0. In the above expression for the IC’s expected net worth, default occurs
if and only if −vIC < −
A+(1+δ)πIC
(1+δ)(1+r) .
112.1.2 The clearing agent’s problem
We next turn to the CA’s problem. Let ACA be the CA’s end-of-day net assets. Recall that
πCA is the CA’s proﬁt from retail payment services and the clearing and settlement of retail
payments submitted by the IC. This proﬁt does not include payment obligations arising from
net payment outﬂows or income earned from charges on overdrafts incurred by the IC.
Let XCA be the CA’s net payment ﬂow arising from its own end-user demand, qCA. The
CA also clears XIC on the IC’s behalf. Hence, the CA’s total net payment ﬂow is XCA+XIC.
As before, XCA + XIC > 0 denotes a net inﬂow, which is credited to the CAs settlement
account at the central bank, and XCA + XIC < 0 denotes a net outﬂow, in which case the
CA draws on credit lines supplied by other direct clearers in the system. We assume that
these (bilateral) credit lines are uncollateralized and no interest charges are levied on them.
We assume that whenever the IC realizes a positive payment ﬂow (net inﬂow), its account
with the CA is credited, whereas a negative payment ﬂow is settled at the end of the day
(that is, the IC draws on the daylight overdraft facilities provided by the CA). Additionally,
we assume that the CA has to settle its payment obligations with respect to other DCs in
the payments system before the IC pays oﬀ its overdraft. As in the case of the IC, if the
CA realizes a net outﬂow, XCA + XIC < 0, it can clear its end-of-day payment obligations
without any asset liquidation only if its cash ﬂow, πCA, is large enough. Furthermore, we
assume that the CA’s end-of-day net asset position is large relative to its payment obligation,
so that it never defaults on its payment obligations.3
In the course of the day, the CA sends payments on behalf of the IC worth XIC and
recovers (1+r)X
−
IC when the IC does not default, or
AIC
1+δ +πIC when the IC defaults. Thus,
we can write the CA’s net worth as follows:
NW
CA = ACA + πCA + XCA + XIC
+
(
0 if πCA + XCA + XIC ≥ 0





−XIC if XIC ≥ 0
−(1 + r)XIC if −
AIC+(1+δ)πIC
(1+δ)(1+r) ≤ XIC < 0
AIC
1+δ + πIC(qIC,qCA) if XIC < −
AIC+(1+δ)πIC
(1+δ)(1+r) ,
3Evidence shows that the largest net debit position of CAs in ACSS as a fraction of shareholders’ equity
ranges from 5 per cent to 12 per cent.
12where πCA is given by equation (2). The last term is just the CA’s expected cash receipts from
the IC, which refer to combined net (CA and IC) payment ﬂows to its settlement account at
the central bank and to any net returns from overdrafts to the IC.
Deﬁne z = XCA + XIC and (z − v) as its net impact on the CA’s net worth. Note that
the CA’s net worth is unchanged for XIC > 0, since this increases both its cash balances and
its deposit liabilities, and increases for XIC < 0, since it provides some net return to the CA.





and has supports [−vCA − vIC,vCA + vIC]. We denote the corresponding cdf as G(z).
Thus, the CA chooses the retail payment volume, qCA, in the second stage and the clearing
fee charged to the IC, w, in the ﬁrst stage to maximize its expected net worth:





























AIC + (1 + δ)πIC
(1 + δ)(1 + r)
. (5)
Note that the ﬁnal term in the above expression disappears if the IC imposes no credit risk
on the CA.
3. Equilibrium
In this section, the equilibrium Cournot quantities are solved as functions of the clearing fee,
and then, given these equilibrium quantities, we solve for the CA’s equilibrium clearing fee.
Recall that the support of the distribution, v, is by assumption independent of the payment
instruction volume, q. Under this assumption, the model solutions in the case with no credit
risk (where the IC never defaults on its payment obligations) are compared with the model
13solutions in the case where the IC imposes credit risk on the CA, given states of the world
where the IC would be forced to default.
3.1 Equilibrium under no credit risk
In this case, the IC’s available assets and expected proﬁtability are assumed to be large enough
by the CA to cover any potential overdraft that the IC might incur, and it is assumed that
any net overdraft revenues are small enough to ignore. The CA perceives no credit risk.
Proposition 1 Cournot equilibrium with no credit risk
Assume that no credit risk is present in the relationship between the IC and the CA,










Proof. See Appendix A.




(2 − γ)(1 − c) − 2βw + βγs




(2 − γ)(1 − c) + γβw − 2βs
4 − γ2 . (7)
Prices charged by the IC and CA to retail customers are:
P
RF
IC (w) = 1 −
(1 + γ)(2 − γ)(1 − c) − (2 − γ2)βw − βγs
4 − γ2 , (8)
P
RF
CA(w) = 1 −
(1 + γ)(2 − γ)(1 − c) − βγw − (2 − γ2)βs
4 − γ2 . (9)
It is also clear from the explicit Cournot solutions that the CA charges a lower price, and
hence has a higher retail market share, than the IC if and only if w > s (i.e., the CA charges
a higher wholesale service fee to the IC in the second-tier network than it is charged by the
central bank in the ﬁrst-tier network).
Proposition 2 Equilibrium clearing fee with no credit risk
14When no credit risk is present, Cournot quantities are given by [qRF
IC (w),qRF
CA(w)] and the














c + βs < w
RF < wpc =
(2 − γ)(1 − c) + βγs
2β
. (10)
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is clear that, since
∂πCA





∂qIC = β(w − c − βs) − γqCA > 0,
or c + βs < wRF. This ﬁrst inequality in equation (10) ensures that the CA does not
earn negative proﬁt out of supplying the clearing service to the IC, ensuring that the CA’s
participation constraint is satisﬁed. The last inequality ensures that the IC’s participation
constraint in the second-tier network is satisﬁed so long as the ﬁxed costs to being an indirect
clearer are suﬃciently small. That is, πIC(wRF) ≥ 0.
Finally, we ensure that the IC has no incentive to withdraw from the tiering relation-
ship and become a direct clearer (DC) itself (and compete symmetrically with the CA), by
assuming that the diﬀerence FDC − FIC is large enough and that FDC approaches FCA in
value:
FDC − FIC ≥










Note that the right-hand side of the above inequality is positive if and only if w ≥ s.
3.2 Equilibrium with credit risk
In this section, we are interested in how the introduction of credit risk aﬀects the CA’s
equilibrium wholesale clearing fee, w, and the corresponding eﬀects on retail quantities and
prices. In this case, the CA is unsure whether the IC’s available assets and proﬁts are
suﬃcient to cover a potential overdraft, and whether it could absorb a potential default
without signiﬁcant proﬁt loss.
Proposition 3 Cournot equilibrium with credit risk
Assume that credit risk is present in the relationship between the IC and the CA, or,








[1 + δG(−πCA)] +
∂πIC
∂qCA
F(χ) = 0, (12)
where χ = −
AIC+(1+δ)πIC
(1+δ)(1+r) .
Totally diﬀerentiating the two ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to w, we can show that
qCR
IC (w) is decreasing in w while qCR
CA(w) is increasing in w, so long as credit risk, represented
by F(χ) > 0, is not too large.
Corollary For a given w, the CA lowers its quantities when credit risk is introduced, while
the IC raises its quantities: qCR
CA(w) < qRF
CA(w) and qCR
IC (w) > qRF
IC (w). However, the retail
prices of the CA and the IC both increase with the introduction of credit risk: P CR
i (w) >
P RF
i (w), i ∈ {CA,IC}.
Proof. The CA’s ﬁrst-order condition in qCA demonstrates that, for a ﬁxed w, the CA’s
quantities fall with credit risk, since ∂πIC/∂qCA = −γqIC < 0 implies that ∂πCA/∂qCA > 0
in equilibrium, or qCR
CA(w) < qRF
CA. Clearly, this implies an increase in qIC in equilibrium.
From the IC’s ﬁrst-order condition in the Cournot game,
qIC =
1 − γqCA − c − βw
2
.



















since 4qCA < 0, in response to the introduction of credit risk.
It is important to bear in mind that the above results are true only when the clearing
fee, w, is ﬁxed. The next proposition examines the eﬀect of introducing credit risk into the
equilibrium clearing fee.
Proposition 4 Equilibrium clearing fee with credit risk
16With credit risk and Cournot quantities given by [qCR
IC (w),qCR
CA(w)], the equilibrium clear-










IC [1 + δG(−πCA) − F(χ)] = 0, (13)
where Cournot quantities are evaluated at wCR.
Proof. See Appendix A.
From the CA’s ﬁrst-order condition with respect to w with no credit risk, evaluated at





RF − c − βs) > 0.
Also, qCR
CA(wRF) < qRF















   
w=wRF
< 0,
we get the result that wCR < wRF; otherwise, wCR > wRF.
Whether a CA that is subject to credit risk imposed by the IC charges a lower or higher
clearing fee to the IC compared with a CA that is not subject to credit risk depends on the
relative strength of two eﬀects. The ﬁrst, which we call the IO eﬀect, arises from the fact
that, for a ﬁxed w, the CA’s quantities decrease and the IC’s quantities increase with credit
risk. This eﬀect tends to raise equilibrium w, since it increases the left-hand side of equation
(13) for a given w. The second eﬀect, which we call the credit-risk eﬀect, is explained by
examining the second term in the CA’s ﬁrst-order condition with respect to w when credit
risk is present. An increase in w lowers the IC’s proﬁt, πIC(w), which in turn increases the
probability F(χ) of a default by the IC on its payment obligations. This tends to reduce
the equilibrium w relative to the no-credit-risk case, where the second term is not present.
Hence, with credit risk, the CA’s equilibrium clearing fee can result in wCR < wRF if the
credit-risk eﬀect outweighs the IO eﬀect.
The CA charges a lower wholesale service fee to the IC than its risk-free fee, to avoid a
default by the IC on any overdrafts it might incur. The CA recognizes that, if it charges a
17high w, it will likely lower the IC’s proﬁts, and that lower IC proﬁts will raise the likelihood
of an IC default on any potential overdraft credit. Consequently, by charging a wholesale fee
no lower than its risk-free fee, the CA might actually increase the probability of a reduction
of its own net worth. Hence, the CA shaves w when signiﬁcant credit risk exists from its
overdraft services to ICs.
In the next section, we show that our numerical results generally yield wCR < wRF,
for reasonable parameter ranges. This fall in the equilibrium clearing fee will exacerbate
both the decrease in the CA’s retail quantities and the increase in the IC’s retail quantities.
Furthermore, we will have to rely on our numerical analysis to determine whether retail prices
rise or fall.
4. Numerical Results
A numerical analysis is needed to fully analyze the impact of credit risk on equilibrium vari-
ables, because of the diﬃculty associated with ﬁnding analytical solutions. One complication
is that choice variables aﬀect regions of analysis under the truncated density functions.
Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan (1994) explain that the cdf of a truncated normal














where x is in the range [a,b], a is the lower truncation point, b is the upper truncation point,
µ is the mean, and σ is the standard deviation.
The relationship between a truncated normal cdf and that of a standard normal is used
to deﬁne F(x,−v,v,0,1) and G(x,−2v,2v,0,
√
2), from which the net value of payment ﬂows
for the IC and CA are, respectively, distributed.
The following base values are chosen for the model’s parameters, in light of the justiﬁca-
tions provided below:
AIC v c s r β γ FIC FCA
0.5 0.5 0.01 0.01 0.0001 0.9 0.9 0 0.19
18To ensure that the IC imposes suﬃcient credit risk on the CA, base values of similar size
are chosen for AIC and v. This is a reasonable assumption, since the IC may, on a given day,
realize payment outﬂows comparable in size to its capital.
The base values chosen for c and s must be reasonably small relative to the prices charged
by the IC and CA, and these prices cannot exceed 1, given the speciﬁc inverse demand facing
these ﬁrms. The impact of changes in c and s is discussed in greater detail below.
The parameter r represents the rate of interest charged on daylight overdrafts provided
by the CA to the IC. A rate of interest is selected that is consistent with the short time frame
for such a loan. Moreover, the results of the numerical analysis are robust to changes in r.
The chosen base level of on-them transactions is 90 per cent; however, it is recognized
that the proportion of on-them transactions is likely to vary across systems and institutions.
Thus, a range of reasonable values are explored in the numerical analysis (i.e., β ∈ [0.5,1]),
and the results are discussed below.
The parameter of substitutability between the IC’s and the CA’s retail payment services
is assigned a base level that reﬂects a signiﬁcant degree of competition between the two ﬁrms.
A reasonably high level of competition is needed to ensure the imposition of credit risk by
the IC on the CA. The impact of changes in γ on the equilibrium variables will depend on
the speciﬁc values for the other key parameters β, s, and c, as illustrated in Appendix B.
The impact of changes in γ on the equilibria results is discussed below.
One of the driving forces in the decision to participate as a CA instead of an IC is the
ﬁxed cost diﬀerential between these two modes of participation. In the numerical analysis,
the ﬁxed cost of being an IC is eﬀectively normalized to zero and the ﬁxed cost of being a
CA is set above zero, to reﬂect the extra cost associated with direct participation. The base
level of FCA is chosen to ensure that the IC has no incentive to withdraw from the tiering
relationship.
Finally, numerical results are summarized in this section, but ﬁgures are relegated to
Appendix B.
194.1 Comparing credit-risk and risk-free equilibria
Generally, relative to risk-free equilibrium values, the presence of credit risk (−χ < vIC) leads
to the following. For the CA, its (i) clearing fee decreases, (ii) retail payment services level
decreases, (iii) retail price increases, and (iv) proﬁts from the retail and wholesale payment
services provision increase. For the IC, its (i) retail payment services level increases, (ii) retail
price decreases, and (iii) proﬁts from the retail payment services provision increase. This is
summarized in the following result.
Result 5 Comparing risk-free and credit-risk equilibria
Assuming suﬃcient credit risk, γ > γ(β,s,c), the following is true:
(i) For the CA, wCR < wRF, qCR
CA < qRF
CA, P CR




(ii) For the IC, qCR
IC > qRF
IC , P CR




Furthermore, γ(β,s,c), the range of conditional γ values supporting these equilibria, is de-
creasing in β, s, and c.
The above result holds for suﬃcient levels of retail competition, and thus credit risk.
Weaker competition leads to higher retail proﬁts for the IC, and, as a consequence, less
credit risk is imposed on the CA. Therefore, when retail competition is suﬃciently weak,
i.e., γ < γ(β,s,c), there is not enough credit risk for its eﬀect to outweigh the IO eﬀect,
in which case the CA charges a higher equilibrium clearing fee relative to the risk-free level
(wCR > wRF). This brings about a reversal of inequalities for the IC: (i) its retail payment
services level decreases, (ii) retail price increases, and (iii) proﬁts from the retail payment
services provision decrease.
Result 6 Comparing risk-free and credit-risk prices
While the IC’s retail price is always lower with credit risk compared with its risk-free price,











CA, γ > ˆ γ(β,s,c).
20Furthermore, ˆ γ(β,s,c), the critical value above which P CR
CA < P RF
CA, is decreasing in β and c,
but is relatively unaﬀected by s.
When γ(β,s,c) < γ < ˆ γ(β,s,c), the CA’s retail price is higher under credit risk. Com-
bined with the result that the IC lowers its retail prices in the credit-risk equilibrium, one
cannot say whether consumers are made better or worse oﬀ. When γ > ˆ γ(β,s,c), the CA’s
retail price is lower with credit risk. Thus, for γ > ˆ γ(β,s,c), consumers are unambiguously
better oﬀ when credit risk is imposed on the CA, or when the CA is required to include an
overdraft facility in its contract arrangement with ICs for wholesale payment services. Since
this critical value, ˆ γ(β,s,c) is decreasing in β and c, the higher these parameters, the more
likely it is that consumers will unambiguously beneﬁt from lower retail prices for payment
services.
Finally, for γ too low, signiﬁcant credit risk to the CA does not exist. This is due to
a lack of competition at the retail level, which leads to IC expected proﬁts that are lower
than in the risk-free case but still suﬃciently high enough, together with available assets, to
avoid default. The CA’s expected proﬁts from both retail and wholesale payment services
are suﬃciently high to absorb losses with little eﬀect.
Table 2 summarizes the discussion associated with results 5 and 6, assuming all other
parameters are set at their base levels. These results indicate that, when credit risk exists,
the CA’s equilibrium pricing strategies in both wholesale and retail service markets, as well
as the impact on the IC’s retail market equilibrium, can vary considerably in relation to the
risk-free equilibria with diﬀerent degrees of retail market competition. The less competitive
the retail market, the more able the CA is to proﬁt in the retail service market from its
vertical integration. Conversely, the more competitive the retail market, the more the CA
would seem to rely on wholesale services for its proﬁtability.
4.2 Comparative statics
The previous section outlined the comparative equilibrium results for a CA and an IC with
and without credit-risk exposure for the CA from its wholesale payment services. This section
indicates how the equilibrium results will change for both these cases, independently of each
other, under diﬀerent values for some of the key parameters of the model.
21Table 2: Comparing credit-risk and risk-free equilibria
0.4 < γ ≤ 0.44 0.45 ≤ γ ≤ 0.9 0.91 ≤ γ < 1







IC > P RF
IC P CR














CA > P RF
CA P CR
CA < P RF
CA
Result 7 Regardless of whether there is credit risk,
d w
d γ
< 0 then > 0,
d qCA
d γ
< 0 then > 0,
d PCA
d γ













With an increase in γ, the retail market becomes more competitive. Holding w ﬁxed, this
reduces quantities, prices, and retail proﬁts (reaction functions pivot on the vertical axis and
become steeper). However, the CA can partially oﬀset the impact of greater competition
by changing equilibrium w. Interestingly, there are ‘tipping points’ in CA pricing behaviour
in the wholesale and retail service markets, which are related to the degree of competition
with the IC in the retail market. For γ suﬃciently low, the CA selects a slightly lower
equilibrium w as γ increases, but only up to a point. Beyond a relatively high level of γ,
the CA charges a higher w for a higher degree of IC competition, raising the IC’s marginal
cost and enabling the CA to increase both its retail market share and retail price, pCA. By
doing so, the CA slows its expected proﬁt declines. Not surprisingly, greater competition
in the retail payment market lowers both the CA’s and the IC’s proﬁtability, but, all else
equal, greater competition results in lower retail prices to consumers only if the degree of
competition does not rise beyond the CA’s tipping point.






















22An increase in β implies that more payments are external to both the CA and the IC
and to the second-tier network. With lower internalization of payments, both banks incur
higher clearing and settlement costs (s for the CA and w for the IC per payment). The
higher marginal costs in the retail payment market, holding w ﬁxed, not surprisingly raise
prices and lower quantities and proﬁts for both the IC and the CA. However, a higher β
(along with the CA’s higher retail price) also increases the volume of payments that the IC
has to settle through the CA. This increase in wholesale service demand seems to outweigh
the higher marginal cost eﬀect on the CA, and the CA responds to the higher β with a lower
wholesale fee, w. Consequently, the demand for wholesale payment services (βqIC) increases
even more with the lower w, mitigating the decline in qIC.












































The comparative statics with respect to c and s are similar and are as one would expect
with changes in the marginal cost of providing payment services. However, while a change in
c aﬀects both the IC and CA to almost the same extent, a change in s aﬀects the CA directly
and the IC indirectly through changes in w. Hence, an increase in c clearly lowers the IC’s
quantities and proﬁts, but an increase in s may not signiﬁcantly change those variables in
equilibrium, if at all.
Table 3 summarizes the comparative statics arising from the numerical analysis.
5. Conclusion
In tiered systems such as the one presented in the model, a CA provides its IC with an
essential input (clearing and settlement services), but also competes against the IC in the
23Table 3: Comparative statics
w qCA qIC PCA PIC πCA πIC
β - - - + + - -
γ -/+ -/+ - -/+ - - -
s + - - + + - -
c + - - + + - -
retail market for payment services. The CA takes advantage of its position as operator of the
second-tier network by strategically pricing its wholesale clearing fee so as to raise its rival’s
costs. Consequently, the IC must oﬀer its retail payment services at a higher price, which
enables the CA to attract greater retail market share.
Even if the CA faces an incentive to raise its rival’s costs by charging a high wholesale
clearing fee to its IC, the general conclusion of this study is that the CA will lower the
wholesale service fee that it charges if the IC can impose suﬃcient credit risk on the CA. The
CA recognizes that an increase in the IC’s proﬁts implies that the IC is less likely to default
on credit provided by the CA. Therefore, when a CA incurs suﬃcient credit risk through the
provision of overdraft settlement loans to an IC, this mitigates the CA’s incentive to raise
the IC’s costs. As a consequence, the CA does not pursue the competitive advantage in the
retail payment services market as aggressively as it might otherwise, and thus it loses some
market share relative to the risk-free case.
Despite the CA’s loss of market share, the analysis indicates that the CA earns higher
proﬁts in a contractual arrangement combining wholesale payment services with overdraft
credit, compared with an arrangement that does not have such a credit facility. The IC also
earns higher proﬁts, except where the degree of competition between the IC and CA is so low
that the credit risk imposed on the CA is insuﬃcient to result in a lower wholesale clearing
fee.
While the price of retail payment services charged by the IC is always lower when it
imposes suﬃcient credit risk on the CA, the price charged by the CA falls only in the presence
of credit risk when the degree of competition between the CA and IC is high. Hence, one
cannot make a general statement about the impact of credit risk on the welfare of consumers.
However, when a greater proportion of the banks’ payments are on-them, less competition is
required for credit risk to result in a decline in the CA’s retail payment services fee, and in
such a case consumers are unambiguously better oﬀ.
24In some tiered arrangements—the ACSS, for example—the CAs are required to include
an overdraft facility in their contract arrangements with ICs for wholesale payment services.
There are some circumstances under which a tiered settlement system that requires the CA
to supply overdraft credit to the IC could potentially be welfare-superior, from a consumer
perspective, to those that do not. An obvious extension of this model is to deﬁne, more
rigorously, the consumer welfare implications of an overdraft facility requirement.
The main ﬁndings of this paper pertain to the impact on equilibrium variables of credit risk
imposed by the IC on the CA. However, the model also highlights the impact of competition,
whether or not credit risk is present. In both the credit-risk and risk-free cases, the retail
price charged by the IC declines with a higher degree of retail competition, yet the same
is not true of the CA’s retail or wholesale price. For lower levels of retail competition, the
wholesale price charged by the CA to the IC decreases as competition increases, but only up
to a point. In other words, with or without credit risk, there is a level of retail competition
beyond which the wholesale price charged by the CA actually increases with increases in
competition, raising the IC’s marginal cost and enabling the CA to increase its retail market
share and retail price.
As indicated earlier, the model that we describe abstracts from competition between
second-tier networks. Developing a model in future work that reﬂects network competition
may contribute insights into other policy concerns pertaining to tiered systems. There are,
for example, two policy questions about tiered networks that are particularly relevant to
payments system eﬃciency: (i) will more ICs, and the resulting internalization of payments
in the second-tier network, inﬂuence the CA’s pricing strategies signiﬁcantly; and (ii) will
competition among CAs lower wholesale contract fees for all ICs, even if some contract
discrimination persists? In terms of ﬁnancial sector stability, the main question is whether
tiered networks can propagate signiﬁcant systemic risk from the second-tier to the ﬁrst-tier
network. Future work to incorporate relevant risk controls into the contract arrangements
between CAs and ICs would help to clarify this issue and its eﬀect on service pricing in both
wholesale and retail markets.
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26Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions













Hence, the IC’s ﬁrst-order condition, assuming an interior solution, is obtained at ∂πIC
∂qIC = 0.





































Hence, the CA’s ﬁrst-order condition, assuming an interior solution, is obtained at ∂πCA
∂qCA = 0.














Proof of Proposition 2 First, we derive
dE(NWCA)
dw and show that the second-order condition is






[1 + δG(−πCA)] = 0,















































4 − γ2 < 0.
Evaluating
dπCA(w)









4 − γ2qCA(w = c + βs) + βqIC(w = c + βs) > 0.
To ensure that this is an equilibrium, we show that the IC’s participation constraint is not violated. Consider
the IC’s participation constraint:
πIC(w) = [1 − qIC(w) − γqCA(w) − c − βw]qIC(w) − FIC ≥ 0.
For small ﬁxed costs, FIC ≈ 0, this is equivalent to
PIC(w) = 1 − qIC(w) − γqCA(w) − c − βw ≥ 0,
and
qIC ≥ 0.
Both these conditions reduce to exactly the same inequality:
w ≤
(2 − γ)(1 − c) + βγs
2β
.
Let wpc denote the w that just satisﬁes the above condition,
wpc =
(2 − γ)(1 − c) + βγs
2β
.









[(4 − γ2)β + (1 − γ)(2 − γ)]c − (1 − γ)(2 − γ) + (4 − γ2)(β − γ)βs
	 2β
4 − γ2.
For c and s small enough, this expression is negative. That is, wRF < wpc.
Finally, we consider the case of a symmetric duopoly with two DCs who clear their own payment instruc-
tions. The equilibrium quantity and proﬁt are functions of s:
qs
DC =










28Thus, the IC has no incentive to quit the tiering relationship and become a DC itself if and only if
πIC(wRF) − πs
DC ≥ 0,
which can be expressed as equation (11).















AIC + (1 + δ)πIC
(1 + δ)(1 + r)
.
Hence, the IC’s ﬁrst-order condition, assuming an interior solution, is obtained at ∂πIC
∂qIC = 0. This is the same
as in the no-credit-risk case. As in the no-credit-risk case, the second derivative is negative.










Hence, the CA’s ﬁrst-order condition, assuming an interior solution, is obtained by setting the above to zero.



























∂qIC∂qCA = 0, ∂πCA
∂qIC < 0 and ∂πIC
∂qCA < 0.
























































Substituting for functional forms, we obtain (13).
Next, we show that the second-order condition is satisﬁed as long as d
2πIC



















which is negative if d
2πIC
dw2 is not too large, due to the fact that d
2πCA
dw2 < 0.
30Appendix B: Graphs from Numerical Solutions
Figures B1, B2, and B3 correspond to Result 5. The ﬁrst set of four graphs (Figures B1 and B2) show how
equilibrium values diﬀer across credit-risk and risk-free cases. Each of the graphs represents the diﬀerence
of credit-risk minus risk-free equilibrium values. Hence, when a curve lies above the x-axis, it indicates that
credit-risk values are higher than risk-free values and vice versa. The next set of three graphs (Figure B3)
show the diﬀerence wCR − wRF against γ for diﬀerent levels of β, s, and c, and show that γ is decreasing
in all these variables. Figure B4 corresponds to Result 6 and shows that the critical value of γ above which
PCR
CA < PRF
CA decreases in β and c, but is relatively unaﬀected by s. Figures B5-B9 correspond to Results
7-10, which present comparative statics.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Bank of Canada Working Papers
Documents de travail de la Banque du Canada
Working papers are generally published in the language of the author, with an abstract in both ofﬁcial
languages, and are available on the Bank’s website (see bottom of page). Les documents de travail sont
généralement publiés dans la langue utilisée par les auteurs; ils sont cependant précédés d’un résumé bilingue.
On peut les consulter dans le site Web de la Banque du Canada, dont l’adresse est indiquée au bas de la page.
Copies and a complete list of working papers are available from:
Pour obtenir des exemplaires et une liste complète des documents de travail, prière de s’adresser à :
Publications Distribution, Bank of Canada Diffusion des publications, Banque du Canada
234 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario  K1A 0G9 234, rue Wellington, Ottawa (Ontario) K1A 0G9
Telephone: 1 877 782-8248 Téléphone : 1 877 782-8248  (sans frais en
                   (toll free in North America) Amérique du Nord)
Email: publications@bankofcanada.ca  Adresse électronique : publications@banqueducanada.ca
Website: http://www.bankofcanada.ca Site Web : http://www.banqueducanada.ca
2006
2006-35 Survey of Price-Setting Behaviour of
Canadian Companies D. Amirault, C. Kwan, and G. Wilkinson
2006-34 The Macroeconomic Effects of Non-Zero Trend Inﬂation R. Amano, S. Ambler, and N. Rebei
2006-33 Are Canadian Banks Efﬁcient? A Canada–U.S. Comparison J. Allen, W. Engert, and Y. Liu
2006-32 Governance and the IMF: Does the Fund Follow Corporate Best Practice? E. Santor
2006-31 Assessing and Valuing the Non-Linear Structure of
Hedge Fund Returns A. Diez de los Rios and R. Garcia
2006-30 Multinationals and Exchange Rate Pass-Through A. Lai and O. Secrieru
2006-29 The Turning Black Tide: Energy Prices and
the Canadian Dollar R. Issa, R. Lafrance, and J. Murray
2006-28 Estimation of the Default Risk of Publicly Traded
Canadian Companies G. Dionne, S. Laajimi, S. Mejri, and M. Petrescu
2006-27 Can Afﬁne Term Structure Models Help Us Predict Exchange Rates? A. Diez de los Rios
2006-26 Using Monthly Indicators to Predict Quarterly GDP I.Y. Zheng and J. Rossiter
2006-25 Linear and Threshold Forecasts of Output and Inﬂation
with Stock and Housing Prices G. Tkacz and C. Wilkins
2006-24 Are Average Growth Rate and Volatility Related? P. Chatterjee and M. Shukayev
2006-23 Convergence in a Stochastic Dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin Model P. Chatterjee and M. Shukayev
2006-22 Launching the NEUQ: The New European Union Quarterly Model,
A Small Model of the Euro Area and the U.K. Economies A. Piretti and C. St-Arnaud
2006-21 The International Monetary Fund’s Balance-Sheet and Credit Risk R. Felushko and E. Santor
2006-20 Examining the Trade-Off between Settlement Delay and Intraday
Liquidity in Canada’s LVTS: A Simulation Approach N. Arjani
2006-19 Institutional Quality, Trade, and the Changing Distribution
of World Income B. Desroches and M. Francis